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Deficits in self-awareness are commonly seen after Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI) and 
adversely affect rehabilitative efforts, independence and quality of life (Ponsford, 
2004). Awareness models predict that executive and implicit functions are important 
cognitive components of awareness though the putative relationship between implicit 
and awareness processes has not been subject to empirical investigation. (Toglia & 
Kirk, 2000; Ownsworth, Clare & Morris, 2006; Crosson et al., 1989). Severity of 
injury, also thought to be a crucial determinant of awareness outcome post-insult, is 
under-explored in awareness studies (Sherer et al., 1989). 
 
The present study measured the contribution of injury severity, IQ, mood state, 
executive and implicit functions to awareness in head-injured patients assigned to 
moderate/severe head-injured groups using several awareness, executive and implicit 
measures. Severe injuries resulted in greater impairments across most awareness, 
executive and implicit measures compared to moderate injuries, although deficits 
were still seen in the moderate group. Hierarchical regression results showed that 
severity of injury, IQ, mood state, executive and implicit functions made significant 
unique contributions to selective aspects of awareness. Future models of awareness 
should account for both implicit and executive contributions to awareness and the 
possibility that both are vulnerable to disruption after neuropathology.  
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Awareness is a complex construct comprising cognitive, psychosocial, and emotional 
components (Toglia & Kirk, 2000). Neural substrates of awareness are thought to 
involve diverse brain regions including prefrontal areas, inferior parietal lobe, angular 
gyrus, supramarginal gyrus, and anterior temporal lobes (Prigatano & Schacter, 1991). 
Consequently, diffuse bilateral brain pathology seen after severe head injury or 
advanced dementia is more likely to produce awareness deficits than focal unilateral 
lesions (Sherer, Hart, Whyte, Todd & Yablon, 2005; Prigatano, 2010). Despite the 
proposed heterogeneity of neural substrates associated with awareness, frontal 
pathology is consistently associated with awareness deficits possibly reflecting the 
functionally integrative role of these brain regions (Rosen et al., 2010, Banks & 
Weintraub, 2009). Duration of time since injury is also associated with extent of 
awareness deficits with impairments typically manifest in the post-acute stage several 
weeks to six months post-injury (Ownsworth, Desbois, Grant, Fleming & Strong 
2006; Fleming & Strong, 1999; Hart, Seignourel & Sherer, 1999). Intelligence 
(Bogod, Mateer & MacDonald, 2003) and emotional state, specifically anxiety and 
depression, have also been shown to correlate with post-injury awareness (Fleming, 
Strong & Ashton, 1998). Epidemiological data show that awareness deficits affect 
approximately 45% of TBI patients (Flashman & McAllister, 2002) and adversely 
affect rehabilitation compliance and outcome, frequency and severity of socio-
behavioral problems, caregiver distress and patient quality of life (King, 1997; Sherer 
et al., 1998; Wise, Ownsworth & Fleming, 2005).  
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Awareness models typically incorporate several stages or ‘types’ of awareness 
(anticipatory, emergent or ‘on-line’ awareness) driven by subsidiary cognitive 
processes (semantic memory, perceptual, emotional and implicit processes) and 
integrated by a metacognitive component (metacognitive or intellectual awareness) 
(Toglia & Kirk, 2000; Morris & Hannesdottir, 2004; Crosson et al., 1989). Executive 
functions, often termed metacognitive, are higher-order supervisory processes that 
initiate, maintain or inhibit other cognitive processes to facilitate goal-directed 
behavior (Miyake et al., 2000; Stuss & Alexander, 2007). Concept formation, self-
monitoring and self-appraisal executive functions are considered key processes 
mediating awareness (Toglia & Kirk, 2000; Crosson et al., 1989). Diverse executive 
functions have been associated with degree of post-TBI awareness including, 
planning and mental flexibility, idea generation or fluency, self-regulation, sustained 
attention, and reasoning ability (Wilson, Alderman, Burgess, Emslie & Evans, 1996; 
Ownsworth, McFarland & Young, 2000; Ownsworth & Fleming, 2005; Bogod, 
Mateer & MacDonald 2003; O’Keeffe, Dockree, Moloney, Carton & Robertson, 
2007). Some researchers have been unable to replicate earlier findings (Ownsworth & 
Fleming, 2005), findings reported elsewhere (Bogod, Mateer & MacDonald, 2003), or 
found no relationship between executive function and awareness (O’Keeffe et al., 
2007). Equivocal findings might be explained by use of limited and varied awareness 
measures across studies, difficulty isolating executive components of executive tasks 
(Hart, Whyte, Kim & Vaccaro, 2005; Ownsworth & Fleming, 2005), absence of a 
consistent conceptual framework across studies, and under exploration of neurological 
variables (injury severity) known to significantly affect executive functions (Mattson 
& Levin, 1990) and awareness (Sherer et al., 2005). 
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Awareness models also include an implicit mechanism thought to guide behavioural 
responses in the absence of conscious awareness of current state (Morris & 
Hannesdottir, 2004; Schacter, 1990), or conversely contribute to metacognitive 
awareness by augmenting conscious knowledge (Toglia & Kirk, 2000). Although 
under-specified the implicit mechanism is an important component of awareness 
models accounting for tacit awareness (evidenced by task avoidance and behavioral 
adaptivity) in the absence of conscious awareness of deficits; a pattern of functional 
outcome well documented in the literature in relation to TBI and Alzheimer’s disease 
(Ownsworth, Clare & Morris, 2006; Trahan, Pépin & Hopps, 2006; Prigatano & 
Schacter, 1991). It is less clear how implicit processes might augment metacognitive 
awareness. 
Implicit processing refers to the acquisition of information expressed through altered 
behavior in the absence of subjective awareness of information acquired. There is 
extensive evidence of the role of implicit processes to social functioning in the 
experimental literature (see a recent review by Frith & Frith, 2009), and neuroimaging 
data show that implicit stimuli produce a corresponding neural signature whilst 
subjective awareness remains at chance levels (Kouider & Dehaene, 2007). Implicit 
experimental paradigms have also been applied to TBI patients (Barker, Andrade, 
Romanowski, Morton & Wasti, 2006; Barker, Andrade, Morton, Romanowski & 
Bowles, 2010; Beldarrain, Grafman, de Valesco, Pascual-Leone & Garcia-Monco, 
2002). Barker et al (2006) found that patients with impaired implicit sequence 
learning had higher behavioral discrepancy scores (indicating impaired awareness) 
than those with intact implicit learning. These findings hint at a possible contribution 
of implicit as well as executive processes to awareness post-injury and provide 
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supporting evidence for an implicit mechanism proposed in awareness models. 
However, models reviewed here do not account for the possibility that implicit 
processes are diminished post-injury instead they are generally assumed to be robust 
to neuropathology (see Reber, 2000 for rationale). Consequently, the integrity of 
implicit processes post-TBI and possible contribution of both implicit and executive 
functions has not been subject to empirical scrutiny in awareness studies.  
 
The present study investigated severity of injury, IQ, mood state, implicit and 
executive contributions to awareness post-injury in a sample of 34 TBI patients using 
several measures of awareness, executive function and implicit cognition. We 
hypothesized that executive functions would contribute to metacognitive awareness 
and that executive and implicit functions would contribute to emergent/anticipatory 
awareness on the basis of theoretical frameworks. We also expected injury severity to 
result in greater impaired awareness on executive function and awareness tasks than 





Research was conducted in accordance with the declaration of Helsinki and 
participants gave informed consent. To account for injury severity, thought to be an 
important determinant of post-injury awareness, 34 participants were assigned to 
moderate (n = 11) and severe (n = 23) head-injured groups (Sherer et al., 1998). 
Injury severity was determined by at least two of the following criteria: (i) GCS score 
on admission (severe < 9, moderate ≥ 9 and < 13), (ii) length of coma (severe > 6 
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hours, moderate < 6 hours > 1 hour), (iii) PTA (severe > 7 days, moderate < 7 days  > 
1 day), (iv) evidence of focal pathology from routine CT and MRI brain scanning 
(Lezak, 1995; Mild traumatic brain injury committee, 1993). Participants were a 
minimum of one year since injury to account for post-acute functional recovery 
(Fleming, Strong & Ashton, 1998). Lesion site could not be identified for four cases 
due to absence of imaging records although clinical and medical records indicated 
anterior neuropathology (see Table 1 for descriptive data).  
 
[Insert table 1 here] 
 
IQ and executive function measures 
Intelligence (Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence, WASI Wechsler, 1999), 
pre-morbid IQ (Wechsler Test of Adult Reading, WTAR The Psychological 
Corporation, 2001), and mood state (Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale, HADS 
Zigmond & Snaith, 1983) were measured to account for variables previously shown 
to affect post-injury awareness (Bogod, Mateer & MacDonald, 2003; Fleming, Strong 
& Ashton, 1998). Due to the multi-componential nature of awareness, executive and 
implicit cognitive constructs several measures of each were selected to best capture 
underlying processes (Miyake et al., 2000; Barker et al., 2006; Andrés & Van Der 
Linden M, 2002). Awareness measures were chosen to measure metacognitive and 
emergent/anticipatory aspects of awareness in line with awareness conceptual models 
(Toglia & Kirk, 2000; Morris & Hannesdottir, 2004; Crosson et al., 1989), and on the 
recommendation of other researchers (O’Keeffe et al., 2007). Tests of executive 
function included, the Self-ordered Pointing Test measure of response monitoring 
(SOPT; Petrides & Milner, 1982), the Sorting Test measure of concept formation (D-
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KEFS, Delis, Kaplan & Kramer, 2001), and the Brixton measure of strategy initiation 
and response inhibition (Hayling and Brixton, Burgess & Shallice, 1997). A Verbal 
Fluency task (FAS - Benton & Hamsher, 1989) was selected as a modality specific 
distractor task for the mere exposure effect task to prevent explicit rehearsal of 
auditory primes and is not considered further here though descriptive data are 
provided (Table 2 results section). Serial Reaction Time and mere exposure effect 
implicit tasks were chosen to measure implicit cognition as they are thought to depend 
on mechanisms governing tacit non-verbal encoding and decoding of contextual cues 
(Lieberman, 2000), and are sensitive to pathology across patient-based studies (Barker 
et al., 2006; Barker et al., 2010; Beldarrain et al., 2002). 
 
Metacognitive awareness measures 
Awareness Questionnaire (AQ - Sherer et al., 1998; Sherer, Hart & Todd, 2003). 
The AQ comprised 17 items comparing individual’s pre- and post-injury abilities and 
consisted of Self and Other versions completed by the participant and family 
member/significant other respectively. Significant others were selected by patients to 
complete Other ratings for AQ and DEX questionnaires on the basis that the person 
knew them well prior to injury and had significant daily contact with them since time 
of injury. Items were rated on a five-point scale from 1 (“much worse”) to 5 (“much 
better”) and summed to give a total score for participant and significant other ratings 
(range 17-85). Self-awareness score was calculated by subtracting Other ratings from 
patient ratings to provide an AQ discrepancy score (range -51 to +51). Positive scores 
indicated that patients underestimated their deficits post-injury. The measure has good 
internal consistency (r =0.88, Sherer et al., 1998; Sherer, Hart & Todd, 2003). 
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Dysexecutive Questionnaire (DEX - Wilson et al., 1996). 
The DEX is a 20-item, 3 factor (cognitive, emotional and motivational) questionnaire 
measuring post-TBI deficits and also comprises Self and Other versions. Items are 
rated on a five-point scale indicating frequency of occurrence ranging from 0 
(“never”) to 4 (“very often”). Items were summed to give a total score for participant 
and Other ratings (range 0-80). Self-ratings were subtracted from Other-ratings to 
produce a Self-Other (DEX-Discrepancy/Insight) score (-80 to +80). As with the AQ 
questionnaire positive DEX-Discrepancy scores represented underestimation of 
deficits by patients. There are no data on the inter-rater reliability of DEX-Other 
ratings or test-retest reliability for DEX-Self or Other raters. Other raters (one per 
patient) for both AQ- and DEX-discrepancy were primarily female (85%) and 
comprised parents (44%), spouse/partner (35%), friends (12%) or other family 
members (9%).  
 
Self-Awareness of Deficits Interview  (SADI - Fleming, Strong & Ashton, 1996). 
The SADI is a semi-structured interview measuring three factors, self-awareness of 
deficits, self-awareness of functional implications of deficits, and ability to set 
realistic goals. Each section was scored on a four-point scale (range 0-3, total score = 
0-9). High scores on the SADI represented low levels of self-awareness across these 
dimensions. The measure has good inter-rater reliability (r = 0.82, Fleming, Strong & 
Ashton, 1996) and good test-retest reliability (r = 0.85 - 0.94, Fleming, Strong & 
Ashton, 1998). 
 
Emergent/anticipatory awareness measures 
Self-Regulation Skills Interview (SRSI - Ownsworth, McFarland & Young, 2000). 
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The SRSI is a five-item semi-structured interview measuring emergent awareness, 
anticipatory awareness, strategy generation, strategy-use and strategy effectiveness. 
The five items were scored on a 10-point scale. Two item scores were summed to 
provide an Awareness Index score (range 0-20) measuring emergent/anticipatory 
awareness of a behavioral problem identified by the participant (for example, memory 
or anger problems) and scored according to standard prompts. The remaining three 
items were combined to generate a Strategy Index score (range 0-30) measuring 
participant’s awareness of any behavioral strategies they used with the identified 
problem(s). Again, high scores represented low levels of awareness. The test has good 
inter-rater (r = 0.81-0.92) and test-retest reliability (r = 0.69-0.91, Ownsworth, 
McFarland & Young, 2000). 
 
SADI and SRSI interviews were conducted and scored by the first author. An 
independent rater scored a random subset of 10 interviews. Results of Pearson’s 
correlations showed a significant degree of inter-rater reliability for SADI total score 
(r = 0.95, p < 0.001), SRSI-Awareness index (r = 0.96, p < 0.001), and SRSI-Strategy 
index scores (r = 0.97, p < 0.001) indicating that interview ratings accurately reflected 
participants’ problems. 
 
Implicit Experimental Tasks 
Serial Reaction Time task (SRT - Nissen & Bullemer, 1987). 
This computer-based task has been used in previous studies with TBI patient and 
control groups (Barker, Andrade & Romanowski, 2004; Barker et al., 2006; Barker et 
al., 2010). Participants completed a practice session before beginning the task. In the 
learning phase participants were told to respond as quickly as possible to a target 
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(1cm white circle) appearing in a predetermined 10 trial sequence, A B C D B C B D 
B C, by pressing the corresponding key (v, b, n or m). The circle remained on the 
screen until the correct key press was made. In random blocks the stimulus circle 
appeared with the same frequency at screen locations as sequence blocks but did not 
follow a sequence. The response-stimulus interval was 200 milliseconds and reaction 
time responses to each trial were recorded. The learning phase consisted of seven 
blocks of 50 trials comprising an initial random block to discourage participants from 
explicitly assuming that circles followed a pattern at the outset of the experiment, 
followed by six sequence blocks. Test phase comprised one sequence block flanked 
by two random blocks and followed immediately after the learning phase without 
warning to participants. Self-determined rest breaks appeared after each block of 50 
trials. A learning score was calculated by summing reaction time (RT) mean of 
medians for each ten-trial sequence  (5 medians summed to produce a mean RT for 
each of the three blocks at test). The sequence block mean was subtracted from the 
random mean (two random block means combined) to produce a sequence learning 
score. After the task participants completed an explicit knowledge questionnaire with 
a maximum score of 16 (Seger, 1997).  
 
Mere exposure effect task (Zajonc, 1968; 1980) 
This task has been used in previous studies with neuropathological and control groups 
(Barker et al., 2010; Barker et al., 2006). Participants were instructed to listen to one 
of two lists of fifteen disyllabic Finnish words, matched for likeability, recorded on 
compact disc and presented audibly as in previous studies. The word list was 
presented twice, at a rate of one word per 1.5 seconds. After the acquisition phase, the 
FAS verbal fluency task was administered as a modality specific distracter to prevent 
                                            Morton: awareness deficits post-TBI 12 
participants from explicitly rehearsing stimulus words after presentation. Participants 
then heard a test list containing all 30 words, targets and foils, recorded in random 
order with a 4 second inter-stimulus interval. For the preference task, participants 
were asked to guess whether the words meant something good or something bad on 
the basis of their sound, rating each word as "very nice/good", "slightly nice/good", 
"slightly nasty/bad" or "very nasty/bad". The mere exposure effect is shown by 
preference for previously presented words relative to foils. Responses were scored on 
a four-point scale (0 = very nasty, 3 = very nice). Preference priming scores were 
calculated by subtracting sum of preference ratings for foil words from sum of 
preference ratings for target words resulting in a preference score ranging from -30 to 
+30. Positive scores indicated a mere exposure effect for target words. 
Procedure 
All measures were administered in counterbalanced order and duration of assessment 
varied from 2.5 to 4 hours.  
 
RESULTS 
We compared scores of moderate and severe groups on neuropsychological measures 
using the Mann Whitney nonparametric test due to unequal group sizes (Table 1). 
Groups were not significantly different in duration of time since injury U = 86.0, p = 
.34, and measures of current (WASI-IQ) U = 98. 5, p = .31, and pre-morbid 
intelligence (WTAR), U = 103.0, p = .80 (Table 2). Mean WASI-IQ scores fell within 
average ranges and there was no significant reduction in intelligence from premorbid 
levels as estimated by the WTAR for both groups F (1,32) = .91, p .35. Mean 
depression (U = 110.0, p = .60) and anxiety scores (U = 116.5, p = .72) were not 
different for groups.  
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[insert table 1 here] 
 
 
Metacognitive Awareness variables 
The severe group had higher total SADI scores than the moderate group indicating 
greater awareness deficits (Table 1). Self-rating mean was lower than Other mean for 
both groups on the DEX questionnaire and higher than Other means on the Awareness 
Questionnaire (where higher scores indicate fewer identified problems) indicating 
diminished awareness of problems for both patient groups. Self-Other Discrepancy on 
the Awareness questionnaire was significantly different for the severe group t (44) = 
3.2, p = 0.003, but not for the moderate group t (20) = .73, p = .48. Self-Other 
discrepancy was also significantly different on the DEX questionnaire for severe t 
(44) = -2.3, p = .02, but not for moderate patients t (20) -.17, p = .87. The severe 
group had significantly lower DEX Self-ratings than the moderate group U = 68.5, p 
= 0.05, suggesting less awareness of executive/emotional and social problems after 
severe compared to moderate head injury (Table 2). 
 
[insert table 2 here] 
  
Anticipatory/Emergent measure of awareness 
The severe group had larger SRSI-Awareness index scores than the moderate group 
indicating more impaired awareness (see Table 1 postscript). There was no difference 
between groups for the SRSI-Strategy measure. Both groups in the current study 
showed impaired awareness on SRSI subscales compared to previous findings with 38 
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TBI patients (SRSI-Awareness, M = 5.6, SRSI-Strategy M = 5.4, Wise, Ownsworth & 
Fleming, 2005) where larger scores were associated with diminished employment 
status. To establish whether SRSI-Awareness and SRSI-Strategy subscales shared 
variance we conducted a Pearson’s correlation for total group scores and results 
showed a moderate correlation between the two measures r (34) = 0.65, p = .01. 
 
Executive function tasks 
The severe group had significantly lower scores on the Sorting Test measure of 
concept formation U = 62.5, p = 0.02 compared to normal ability in the moderate 
group (Table 2). Severe participants generated fewer items on FAS verbal fluency U = 
70, p = 0.04 (although both group mean scores fell within normal ranges), and showed 
a higher number of errors on the SOPT measure of response monitoring U =65.5, p = 
0.02 than the moderate group.  
 
Implicit experimental tasks 
Both groups showed a lack of mere exposure effect (no preference for previously 
exposed targets compared to foils at test), and were not significantly different in this 
respect U = 107.0, p = .47 (see Table 2). This is an impaired pattern of performance 
on this task compared to control data with 20 participants (M = 3.5, SD = 3.2, Barker 
et al., 2006) and 16 participants (M = 3.2, SD = 3.3, Barker et al., 2010) respectively. 
The moderate group showed some learning on the SRT (shown by a positive mean 
score), that differed significantly from the severe group who showed little implicit 
learning U = 83, p = .05. However, moderate group performance (M = 29.3, SD = 
61.7) also fell in the impaired range when compared to control data with 20 
participants (M = 82.4, SD = 41.1, Barker et al., 2006) and 16 participants (M = 96.4, 
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SD = 40.5, Barker et al., 2010). Neither group reached the cut-off criterion of 16 on 
the explicit measure, M = 6.6 (SD = 4.9) for the moderate group, and M = 1.9 (SD = 
3.1) for the severe group. 
To summarize, groups were not different in time since injury, IQ or mood state. The 
severe group had greater awareness deficits on SADI and SRSI-Awareness measures 
than the moderate group, although both groups showed impaired emergent awareness 
on SRSI-Awareness and -Strategy indices. Groups had discrepant Self- and Other- 
ratings on AQ and DEX awareness measures that differed significantly for the severe 
group. The severe group had greater impairment on the SOPT and Sorting Test 
measures of executive function than the moderate group. Neither group showed a 
priming effect for previously exposed stimuli and the severe group had significantly 
lower learning scores on the SRT task than the moderate group, although both group 
mean scores were low compared to published control data. Due to the small sample 
size all further analyses were conducted on the total sample of 34 participants. 
 
We conducted 5 separate hierarchical multiple regressions with each of the criterion 
variables (DEX and AQ-discrepancy, SADI, SRSI-Awareness and SRSI-Strategy) to 
establish the unique contribution of predictors to the variance in criterion variables 
with the contribution of other variables accounted for. We followed the standard 
convention of introducing demographic variables of IQ, mood state and injury 
severity at block one to account for any effects and measured the unique and 
additional contribution of theoretically important predictors in block two. In block 
one, measures of intelligence (WASI), emotional state (HADS combined anxiety and 
depression score), and severity of injury were entered into the analysis. Executive 
function variables, SOPT, Sorting Test, and Brixton scores were entered in block two 
                                            Morton: awareness deficits post-TBI 16 
for the metacognitive criterion variables (SADI, AQ- and DEX-discrepancy scores). 
For the emergent/anticipatory awareness criterion variables (SRSI-Awareness and 
SRSI-Strategy), implicit task predictors (SRT learning score and mere exposure effect 
preference score) were also entered into the analysis with executive function predictor 
variables at block two (see Table 3).  
 
[Insert table 3 here] 
 
Regression statistics show that the greatest change to models occurred for the SADI 
criterion variable with the addition of severity of injury, WASI and HADS at block 
one, and SRSI-Awareness and SRSI-Strategy criterion variables with the addition of 
executive and implicit variables in block two (Table 3). Beta values and significance 
levels of each predictor are shown in table four.  
 
[Insert table 4 here] 
 
The strongest unique predictor of the SADI metacognitive criterion variable was 
severity of injury followed by mood state measured by the HADS. For AQ- and DEX- 
discrepancy criterion variables the strongest unique predictor was response 
monitoring measured by the SOPT, followed by mood state (HADS) for AQ-
Discrepancy only. For the emergent/anticipatory criterion variables, the strongest 
unique predictors of SRSI-Awareness were response monitoring (SOPT), concept 
formation (Sorting test), IQ, severity of injury and implicit learning on the SRT task. 
The strongest unique predictor of the SRSI-Strategy emergent awareness measure was 
concept formation, followed by implicit learning on the SRT task. The Brixton 
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executive function task and mere exposure effect implicit task made no significant 
contribution to criterion variables in regression models. It is likely that mere exposure 
effect made no significant contribution to the regression model because neither patient 
group showed any priming effects at test and the variance in scores across participants 
was therefore small for the severe group (mean = -1.36, SD 4.0 and for the moderate 
group (mean = -0.26, SD 4.9).  Normal populations typically show a small but robust 
priming effect on this task (Barker et al., 2006; Barker et al., 2010).  
 
DISCUSSION 
The present study investigated the contribution of injury severity, IQ, mood state, 
executive and implicit function contributions to metacognitive and 
emergent/anticipatory awareness post-injury. Results of non-parametric analyses 
showed that the severe group had greater impairment on metacognitive measures of 
awareness (SADI, AQ- and DEX-Discrepancy), and emergent/anticipatory awareness 
measured by the SRSI-Awareness subscale. Metacognitive awareness is thought to 
depend on executive, processes and emergent/anticipatory awareness is thought to 
depend upon executive, implicit and other sub-component (episodic and working 
memory) processes (Toglia & Kirk, 2000; Morris & Hannesdottir, 2004). In line with 
this assumption, the severe group also had greater impairment than the moderate 
group on executive measures of concept formation, verbal fluency, response 
monitoring (indexed by Sorting Test, FAS and SOPT respectively), and implicit 
cognition measured by the SRT task. We did not find global awareness, executive and 
implicit deficits after severe compared to moderate injury possibly reflecting the 
multi-componential nature of these functions.  
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Groups were not different in time since injury, current and premorbid IQ and mood 
state and showed similarly impaired scores on the SRSI-Strategy measure of 
emergent/anticipatory awareness and the mere exposure effect implicit task. The 
moderate group showed impaired metacognitive (AQ- and DEX-discrepancy scores) 
and emergent awareness (SRSI-Awareness and SRSI-Strategy scores), and 
diminished implicit learning and priming compared to normative data (Barker et al., 
2006; Barker et al., 2010).  
 
Metacognitive awareness measures 
We found no appreciable contribution of executive function to metacognitive 
awareness measured by the SADI, instead only injury severity and mood state 
significantly predicted scores on this variable. Injury severity is a relatively non-
specific variable and we found that executive and implicit functions decreased as a 
function of severity of injury so it is possible that the significant contribution made by 
the severity variable to SADI scores masked the contribution of other variables to this 
measure. However, further investigation of the SADI is probably warranted to 
establish which aspects of awareness are captured by this measure. Combined anxiety 
and depression scores also predicted metacognitive awareness measured by SADI and 
AQ-discrepancy measures with greater emotional distress associated with lower 
awareness scores (i.e. greater awareness) suggesting that increased emotional distress 
might heighten self-reflection/self-evaluation (Godfrey, Partridge, Knight & Bishara, 
1993; Forgas, 1998; Alloy & Abramson, 1979). It remains to be established whether 
improved awareness of deficits increases emotional distress or emotional distress 
precipitates more accurate self-appraisal, and it is likely that the relationship between 
awareness of functional deficits and mood state is bidirectional. 
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The executive function of response monitoring (number of errors made) measured by 
the SOPT was the largest unique predictor of metacognitive awareness measured by 
AQ- and DEX-discrepancy measures (see Hart et al., 2005 for similar findings). 
Errors on the SOPT occur due to failure to effectively monitor previously used 
responses (Petrides & Milner, 1982). Other findings show that diminished self-
monitoring processes deleteriously affect self-report accuracy of cognitive deficits 
post-injury (Schmitz, Rowley, Kawahara & Johnson, 2006; Oddy, Coughlan, 
Tyerman & Jenkins, 1985). Our findings support the assumption that self-monitoring 
is an important executive process mediating metacognitive awareness proposed by 
theoretical models (Toglia & Kirk, 2000; Ownsworth, Clare & Morris, 2006). 
Response monitoring is also likely to recruit working memory processes and working 
memory span has been associated with successful SOPT performance (Rich, Blysma 
& Brandt, 1996). Future work should incorporate executive function and working 
memory measures to further extract the constituent cognitive components of 
awareness post-head injury. 
 
Emergent/anticipatory awareness 
The strongest unique predictors of emergent/anticipatory awareness measured by 
SRSI-Awareness were concept formation (Sorting Test scores) and response 
monitoring (SOPT error scores) contributing an equal amount of variance to the 
criterion variable. Current IQ status and severity of injury were the second strongest 
predictors of SRSI-Awareness also contributing an equal amount of variance to 
emergent awareness scores. In the present study IQ was assessed using two subtests, 
one of verbal knowledge/reasoning and the other involving abstract rule detection and 
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nonverbal reasoning processes, either or both of these aspects of ability could have 
contributed to scores on awareness measures. Severity of injury also made a 
significant contribution to emergent awareness, as with the SADI metacognitive 
criterion variable indicating some general effects of diffuse neuropathology to 
awareness indexed by this measure. 
 
Implicit learning measured by the SRT task made a significant contribution to 
emergent awareness. Concept formation and implicit learning also contributed 
significantly to awareness measured by the SRSI-Strategy awareness subscale. This 
latter effect is likely to reflect shared variance across SRSI-Awareness and –Strategy 
subscales shown by the moderate correlation between indices, and that specific 
executive and implicit predictors captured these shared processes across the two 
measures. In contrast, response monitoring only significantly contributed to SRSI-
Awareness, although the beta was large but non-significant for the contribution of 
response monitoring to awareness indexed by the SRSI-Strategy subscale.  
 
The contribution of implicit learning to emergent awareness shown in present data 
raises questions about the mechanisms underpinning sequence detection and learning 
on this task (Barker et al., 2006; Barker et al., 2010; Lieberman, 2000). One candidate 
explanation is that learning on the task depends upon the integrity of an implicit 
anticipatory/ predictive mechanism mediated by frontal circuitry and diminished or 
abolished after neuropathology (Seidler et al., 2005; Wong, Bernat, Bunce & Shevrin, 
1997), that may contribute to other functions including emergent awareness. 
Typically, participants are faster on sequence compared to random trials on the SRT 
task because they have learned the sequence and can predict/anticipate subsequent 
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stimulus locations (Seger, 1997). Although the exact cause of absence of learning on 
the task remains to be elucidated, slowed responses on sequence compared to random 
blocks at test indicate that participants are unable to anticipate or predict subsequent 
stimulus locations. Head-injured participants also usually show an absence of explicit 
knowledge of the sequence shown by low scores on the explicit measure indicating 
that participants are not relying on explicit awareness of the sequence to facilitate 
performance in the absence of implicit learning. This finding is relatively robust and 
has been replicated across several studies with different head-injured cohorts (Barker 
et al., 2006; Barker et al., 2010; Beldarrain et al., 2002).  
 
Overall, regression data indicate that failure to implicitly encode contextual 
regularities and accurately predict/anticipate a response, inability to formulate and 
monitor response strategies and injury severity is associated with impaired emergent 
awareness. IQ, mood state, injury severity and response monitoring contribute to 
metacognitive awareness. It remains to be established if these functions share similar 
neural substrates (although see Seidler et al., 2005; Schmitz et al., 2006; Sherer et al., 
2005), and/or typically operate as a functional system(s) mediating awareness that 
may be differentially affected by neuropathology.  
 
Considered together our findings might shed some light on anecdotal reports of 
patients who express awareness of deficits but are unable to read and respond to social 
cues appropriately (Prigatano & Schacter, 1991), and those who show intact implicit 
awareness by avoiding tasks they find difficult but who seem unable to verbalize 
awareness deficits (Schacter, 1990; Kihlstrom & Tobias, 1991; Morris & 
Hannesdottir, 2004). Although speculative these patterns of functional outcome might 
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reflect some dissociation of emergent/anticipatory and metacognitive awareness 
and/or differential impairment to cognitive functions contributing to these aspects of 
awareness. Although there is a growing body of evidence investigating executive 
components of awareness (Ownsworth, McFarland & Young, 2000; Ownsworth & 
Fleming, 2005; Bogod, Mateer & MacDonald 2003; O’Keeffe et al., 2007), less 
attention has been paid to the empirical measurement of implicit cognition in 
awareness studies. Our findings go some way to elucidate some of the constituent 
components of metacognitive and emergent/anticipatory awareness and the 
differential effects of moderate and severe injuries on these functions and awareness 
more generally.   
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Table 1: Demographic, neurological, intelligence, emotion and awareness variables 
for moderate, severe and total TBI group. 
Demographic, neurological 
and test variables 
Moderate Group 
mean (SD’s, range)  
(n =11) 
Severe Group 
 mean (SD’s, range) 
(n = 23) 
Total Group  
mean (SD’s, range) 






TBI severity variables 
Time since injury (months) 
GCS score on admission 




Lesion site CT/MRI scans 
(Number of participants) 
1. Unilateral frontal region 
 
2. Bilateral frontal and other 
brain region. 
 
4. Unilateral frontal and other 
brain region 
 
5. Unilateral Temporal 
 
6. No imaging data available 
 
Type of injury 





31.6 (10.3, 20-54) 
11.9 (2.4, 10-18) 
 
 
47.5 (48.8, 12-149) 
13.0 (2.7, 9-15) 
1.8   (2.4, 0-6) 
























36.6   (10.0, 18-55) 
11.5   (1.3, 9-15) 
 
 
74.6    (63.7, 12-240) 
5.2       (3.4, 3-8) 
396.4   (349.1, 8-1176) 
























35.0   (10.2, 18-55) 
11.6   (1.7, 9-18) 
 
 
66.2    (60.0, 12-240) 
8.1      (5.0, 3-15) 
277.3   (343.9, 0-1176) 
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Table 2: Moderate and severe subgroup and total group scores for executive and 
implicit experimental tasks (mean, SD, and range).  
* p < 0.05, p** = 0.04, †p = 0.001, 
††




Measure Moderate Group 
(n = 11) 
Severe Group 
(n = 23) 
Total Group, mean (SD), 
range 
(N = 34) 
Intelligence 
WASI Full Scale IQ 
WTAR premorbid IQ 
 
Emotional State 
HADS – Anxiety 
HADS - Depression 
 
Awareness Measures 
Self-Awareness of Deficits Interview 










Self-Regulatory Skills Interview –
Awareness Index (SRSI-A)  
 
SRSI – Strategy Index (SRSI-S) 
Executive function measures 
 
Sorting Test combined description 
scaled score 
 
Self Ordered Pointing test (SOPT) 
– total errors 
 
Brixton task – total errors 
 
FAS – total number of words 
 
Implicit Cognitive tasks 
 
Serial Reaction Time Test (SRT) – 
Learning Score 
 
Mere exposure preference score  

































































































92.7 (16.6, 63-135) 
96.9 (11.9, 74-122) 
 
 
9.4 (3.8, 2-18) 
6.9 (4.4, 1-17) 
 
 
3.2 (2.3, 0-8) 
 
 
38.1 (14.3, 20-85) 
29.7 (6.7, 21-48) 
8.4 (14.3, -7-58) 
 
36.7 (18.1, 1-73) 
45.1 (16.7, 4-77) 
8.3 (20.4, -26-63) 
 
13.2 (5.2, 0-20) 
 
 
17.9 (6.7, 6-30) 
 
 
7.4 (3.6, 1-16) 
 
 




5.6 (2.1, 2-10) 
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Table 3: Hierarchical regression model statistics for all predictor and criterion 
variables. 
 

























6.69 3.25 1.74 3.55 1.10 
p 
 





0.44 0.27 0.28 0.19 0.06 
 
Executive function variables (block 2) 
 
 
Executive function and 

























0.77 2.84 3.80 4.62 4.01 
p 
 





0.05 0.20 0.28 0.33 0.35 
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Table 4: Beta values and significance level for all predictor and criterion variables in 




















































































































































































*p ≤ .05 **p ≤ .01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
